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Abstract. Data privacy has been studied in the area of statistics (sta-
tistical disclosure control) and computer science (privacy preserving data
mining and privacy enhancing technologies) for at least 40 years. In this
period models, measures, methods, and technologies have been devel-
oped to eﬀectively protect the disclosure of sensitive information.
The coming of big data, with large volumes of data, dynamic and
streaming data, poses new challenges to the ﬁeld. In this paper we will
review some of these challenges and propose some lines of research in the
ﬁeld.
1 Introduction
Data privacy studies models and methods to ensure that there is no disclosure of
sensitive information. The ﬁeld arose within the statistics community to ensure
that sensitive data from census were not disclosed. Later, the problem appeared
within the computer science community to ensure privacy in communications,
and databases. Three main research communities exist today: statistical disclo-
sure control, privacy enhancing technologies, and privacy preserving data mining.
They study similar problems, although the focus is slightly diﬀerent due to the
types of data they consider and the type of uses of these data.
The ﬁeld has now more than 40 years, starting with e.g. the seminal papers
of Dalenius [5,6], Chaum [4], and Denning and Schlo¨der [7]. During these years,
diﬀerent types of privacy models have been deﬁned, methods to protect sensitive
information according to these privacy models have been proposed, and measures
for evaluating disclosure risk, and information loss have also been deﬁned. There
is a large number of approaches for diﬀerent types of data. This does not mean
that all problems are solved, but there exists already a solid and useful set of
techniques for ensuring diﬀerent levels of privacy for some types of applications.
See e.g. the reference books [8,11,19] for details.
The increasing amount of information available, and the coming of big data
and data science poses new problems to the ﬁeld. In this paper we will review
some of these problems, and outline accordingly some lines for further research.
The new EU General Data Protection Regulation includes the implementa-
tion of the right to rectiﬁcation and the right to be forgotten. That is, companies
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need to modify or delete records from a database when users and citizens want
to take advantage of these rights. In order to implement these rights, data prove-
nance plays a central role. Data provenance is not a topic speciﬁc for big data,
but it is with big data, distributed, and dynamic databases, where it can be used
in its full potentiality. We discuss in this paper some research topics related to
privacy and provenance.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we review some of the
existing approaches for privacy on standard databases. In Sect. 3 we focus on the
problem for big data. We review its deﬁnition and discuss some of the research
questions that we consider more relevant with respect to privacy for big data.
In Sect. 4 we focus on the problems related to data provenance. We discuss data
provenance and how data provenance interacts with data privacy. The paper
ﬁnishes with a summary.
2 Data Privacy for Databases
A large number of mechanisms have been developed for ensuring data privacy.
They can be classiﬁed according to diﬀerent dimensions. We classify them [16]
according to our knowledge on the type of analysis a third party wants to apply
to this data.
– Data-driven or general purpose. In this case, we have no knowledge on the
type of analysis to be performed by a third party. This is the usual case in
which data is published through a server for future use. It also includes the
case that data is transferred to a data miner or a data scientist for its analysis
as we usually do not know which algorithm will be applied to the data. For
this purpose, anonymization methods, also known as masking methods have
been developed.
– Computation-driven or speciﬁc purpose. In this case, we know the exact analy-
sis the third party (or third parties) wants to apply to the data. For example,
we know that the data scientist wants to ﬁnd the parameters of a regression
model. This can be seen as the computation of a function or as solving a
query for a database without disclosing the database. When a single database
is considered and we formulate the problem as answering a query, diﬀerential
privacy is a suitable privacy model. In the case that multiple databases are
considered, the privacy model is based on secure multiparty computation and
cryptographic protocols are used for this purpose.
– Result-driven. In this case, the analysis (a given data mining algorithm) is also
known. The diﬀerence with computation-driven approaches is that here we are
not worried on the protection of the database per se, but on the protection
of some of the outcomes of the algorithm. For example, we know that data
scientists will apply association rule mining, and we want to avoid that they
infer that people buying diapers also buy beers. Similarly as in computation-
driven analysis, prevention of disclosure for this type of analysis is speciﬁc to
the given computation producing the speciﬁc results. In this case, however,
the focus is on the knowledge inferred from the data instead of the actual data.
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In this paper we focus on anonymization or masking methods. That is, data-
driven methods. In short, anonymization algorithms (masking methods) trans-
form a data ﬁle X into a ﬁle X ′ with data of less quality. This quality reduction
ensures a certain privacy level according to some pre-established privacy model.
This is an approach that can be applied to any type of database. It has been suc-
cessfully applied to, for example, databases, documents, search logs, and social
networks.
In addition, the approach is valid not only for protecting data from a syntactic
point of view, but also from a semantic point of view. That is, taking into account
the meaning of the terms and concepts in the data. For example, when we have
words and categories in documents and search logs. For this purpose, we can use
masking methods that use ontologies (as e.g. wordnet and ODP) to protect the
data.
As masking methods modify the original data reducing its quality, three
main research questions appear in the process. The ﬁrst one is how to reduce
the quality of the data. This is done by the masking methods themselves. There
is a plethora of methods for this. Then, as data is modiﬁed we need to be sure
that there is no information loss in the process or that this information loss
is as low as possible. In other words, data utility is not reduced substantially
in the masking process. Information loss measures are deﬁned to quantify this
information loss. Finally, although the quality of the data is reduced to avoid
the disclosure of sensitive information, there is no guarantee that all methods
satisfy this property. Disclosure risk measures have been deﬁned to quantify
the disclosure risk of anonymized data, and they are tightly related to privacy
models.
As a summary, we list below the three main research issues related to masking
methods.
– Masking methods. Methods that given a database X transform it into another
one X ′ with less quality. Masking methods are usually classiﬁed into three
categories: perturbative, non-perturbative and synthetic data generators. Per-
turbative methods reduce the quality by means of modifying the data intro-
ducing some kind of error into the data. Noise addition and multiplication,
microaggregation and rank swapping are examples of perturbative methods.
Non-perturbative methods reduce the quality of the data making them less
detailed (but not erroneous). Generalization and suppression are examples of
them. Synthetic data generators replace the original data by data generated
from a model, which has been extracted from the original database. So, the
data in X ′ is not the original data but artiﬁcial data generated from the model.
– Information loss measures. They measure in what extent the transformation
of X into X ′ reduces the utility of the data, and the information that is lost
in the process. Information loss measures are typically deﬁned in terms of an
analysis f to be performed to the data. Then, given this analysis f and the
original and anonymized ﬁles X and X ′, we deﬁne information loss as
ILf (X,X ′) = divergence(f(X), f(X ′)).
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where divergence is a function that evaluates how far are f(X) and f(X ′).
A distance on the space of f(X) can be used for this purpose. Naturally, we
expect divergence (Y, Y ) = 0 for all Y . Typical examples of functions f include
some statistics (means, variances, covariances, regression coeﬃcients), as well
as machine learning algorithms (clustering and classiﬁcation algorithms). Spe-
ciﬁc measures for some types of databases have also been considered in the
literature (e.g., measures on graphs).
– Privacy models and disclosure risk measures. They focus on what extent
anonymized (masked) data still contains sensitive information that can be
used to compromise the privacy of the individuals of the database.
3 Data Privacy for Big Data
In this section we propose a few open research questions related to big data. To
do so, we outline ﬁrst a deﬁnition of big data, and the major diﬃculties we ﬁnd
with respect to disclosure risk in big data.
3.1 Big Data
There exists several deﬁnitions for big data based on the characteristics of the
data. The well-known deﬁnition based on the 3Vs underlines volume, velocity,
and variety as the main characteristics of big data. There are other deﬁnitions
that expand this deﬁnition with additional terms. They are the deﬁnitions based
on 4Vs, 5Vs, or even 7Vs.
– Volume. Databases include huge amounts of data. For example, facebook gen-
erated 4 new petabytes of data per day in October 2014 (see [21]).
– Velocity. Data is ﬂowing to the databases in real time: real time streams of
data ﬂowing from diverse resources. Either from sensors or from internet (from
e-commerce or social media).
– Variety. Data is no longer of a single type (or a few simple types). Databases
include data from a vast range of systems and sensors in diﬀerent formats and
datatypes. This may include unstructured text, logs, and videos.
3.2 Moving Privacy to Big Data: Disclosure Risk
For big data, in principle, the same research questions mentioned in the previous
section appear. We need to develop masking methods, information loss measures
and disclosure risk measures. For them, we need to take into account that the
amounts of data are larger, and thus we need to deal with the corresponding
computational problems. Nevertheless, besides of that, a new issue appears: there
is a new level for privacy risk. This new level of risk is caused by the following
three problems.
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– Lack of control and transparency. It is more and more diﬃcult to know who
has our data. There are diﬀerent organizations that can have information
about ourselves without us knowing it. Information is gathered from sensors
and cameras, obtained through screening posts in social networks, and from
analysis of web searches. Note also the case of tracking cookies. Finally, there
are data brokers that gather as much information as possible about citizens.
– Linkability. It is usual for big data to link databases to improve the amount
and quality of the information. Linking databases increase the risk of identi-
ﬁcation as there is more information for each individual. Note that the more
information we have on individuals the easier to reidentify them, and the more
diﬃcult to protect them.
– Inference and data reusability. There exist eﬀective inference algorithms that
infer sensitive information (e.g., sexual orientation, political and religious aﬃl-
iation [12]). One of the main goals of big data analytics is to use existing data
for new purposes. This increases the inference ability. As a side eﬀect, data is
never deleted waiting for future use.
In the next section we propose a few research lines for data privacy for big
data. They are proposed in relation to these three problems just mentioned.
3.3 Open Research Questions for Big Data
We propose in this section a few research questions related to big data. The ﬁrst
one is about the need to inform users about the risks of inference due to big data.
Then, we propose some lines related to anonymization of stand-alone and linked
databases. It follows another question related to the need of developing (and
using) user privacy. We also discuss the need of developing eﬃcient algorithms
for data protection in data privacy. This need is both for user privacy, and
respondent and holder privacy. The last one is about data provenance, an issue
that is further developed in Sect. 4.
These lines of research are based on our own work (see e.g. [1,17,18]), and
on the research lines discussed in [15].
– Issue #1. Technology should help people to know what others know and can
infer about them.
As we have stated above, eﬀective machine learning and data mining algo-
rithms can infer sensitive information. Some of these models use data that
does not seem a priori sensitive. It is insuﬃcient that we protect sensitive
information without protecting what permits us to infer sensitive information.
Technology should help people to know about this, and e.g. provide tools in
social networks to make people aware of this fact.
– Issue #2. Databases should be anonymized/masked in origin. Machine learn-
ing algorithms for masked data are required.
On the one hand, there exist masking methods that are eﬀective in the sense
that they achieve low information loss (with loss disclosure risk). On the other
hand, there are machine learning and data mining algorithms that are resitant
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to errors. In the same direction, not all data is equally important for machine
learning algorithms, and some data mining algorithms for big data do not use
all data but only a sample of them. Because of that, it is meaningful to con-
sider privacy by design machine learning algorithms. That is, machine learning
methods that are appropriate for data that has already been protected.
Preprocessing methods for machine learning (dimensionality reduction, sam-
pling, etc.) should be combined with and integrated to masking methods.
Masking methods can be seen as methods to introduce noise and reduce qual-
ity, but they can also be seen as methods for dimensionality reduction. See e.g.
the case of microaggregation and, in general, methods to achieve k-anonymity.
They reduce the number of (diﬀerent) records in a database by means of gen-
eralization or clustering (i.e., building centroids). These generalized records or
centroids can be seen as more consolidated (error-free) data.
– Issue #3. Anonymization needs to provide controlled linkability.
We have reported that linkability is one of the basic components of big data.
Companies want to combine databases to increase the information about
individuals (enlarging the set of variables/attributes available on them). If
databases are anonymized in origin, we need ways to ensure that these data-
bases can still be somehow linked in order to fulﬁll big data requirements.
k-anonymity allows linkability at group level. Algorithms for controlled linka-
bility are needed, as well as methods that can exploit e.g. linkability at group
level.
– Issue #4. Privacy models need to be composable.
Given several data sets with a given privacy guarantee, their combination
needs to satisfy also the privacy requirements. There are results on the com-
posability of diﬀerential privacy. See e.g. [15].
– Issue #5. User privacy should be in place: decentralized anonymity.
User privacy [17] is when users have an active role in ensuring their own
privacy. For this purpose, there are methods to protect the identity of the
users as well as to protect their data. For example, there are methods for user
privacy in communications and in information retrieval.
While the research questions mentioned above are to be implemented and used
by data holders, user privacy provides users with tools to be used by them-
selves. User privacy permits that data are anonymized before their transmis-
sion to data collectors (or to the service provider). So, there is no need to trust
the data collector. Local anonymization and collaborative anonymization are
keywords for tools for user privacy.
– Issue #6. Methods for big data.
Big data have particularities (the three or more Vs discussed above) that
have to be taken into account when developing methods for ensuring privacy.
These particularities are for both respondent and holder privacy (i.e., methods
applied by data holders) and for user privacy. We can distinguish three types
of situations.
• Issue #6.1. Large volumes of data. Eﬃcient algorithms are required for
data of high dimension. Algorithms are required for producing masked
databases, but also for computing information loss measures and disclosure
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risk. There exist already some masking methods that have been developed
with eﬃciency in mind for standard databases (e.g., some algorithms for
microaggregation), for graphs and social networks (e.g., based on random
noise on edges, on generalization and microaggregation), and for location
privacy. New methods are needed.
• Issue #6.2. Dynamic data. When data changes with respect to time, we
may need to publish several copies of the database. In this case, speciﬁc
data masking algorithms are required. Note that independent application
of algorithms for k-anonymity to the same database can cause disclosure.
So, the same applies when the database has changed between two appli-
cations of the algorithm.
• Issue #6.3. Streaming data. Data is received continuously and should be
processed as soon as possible because we cannot hold them and process
them later. In this case, diﬃculties arise because at any time information
is only partial. Methods based on sliding windows have been developed
for this purpose.
– Issue #7. Data provenance and data privacy.
The new EU General Data Protection Regulation grants citizens the right
to rectify and delete the information about themselves in companies. Data
provenance are the data structures that permit companies to know where
the information of customers and users is in their databases. Diﬀerent open
research questions appear in the crossroad between provenance and privacy.
One of them is the fact that data provenance can contain sensitive information
and, thus, privacy technologies needs to be applied to it. At the same time, the
fact that data can be modiﬁed using data provenance according to customers’
requirements poses new privacy problems. We discuss these issues in more
detail in the next section. These research topics can also be considered for
databases of small and medium size but it is with big data that the research
becomes challenging.
4 Data Privacy and Data Provenance
Data provenance is becoming a key issue in data management, and can have a
great impact in data privacy. Despite its relevance it has not been given much
attention until recently from the data privacy community. Information provided
as provenance can be used to improve privacy data mechanisms, but it is impor-
tant to note that provenance itself has to be protected from inferences [14]. In
the era of big data and online social networks, data provenance is also useful to
help users to assess the validity and trust of the information. For instance, it
can help to identify rumormongers and disinformation centers. As we show in
Sect. 4.2 data provenance can play an important role in the future of big data
privacy research.
Broadly speaking, data provenance can be seen as metadata or as an anno-
tation of the data. That is, data is expanded with information of the processes
that has led to this data. Provenance can be coarse-grained or ﬁne-grained.
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That is, we can have information on how a bunch of data (i.e., ﬁles or databases
have been produced) or we can have information particularized at the record
or even at the value level. Fine-grained provenance is what makes provenance
useful, as it is only in this case that we have detailed information on how any
data element has been produced. E.g., we can know who entered the temperature
(fever) of a patient, or in which store our client claimed for a discount.
There are diﬀerent ways to represent data provenance. There are two types of
provenance. They are where provenance and why provenance. Where provenance
describes the origin of the data, and why provenance the process that generated
the data. A data element in a database typically proceeds from the combination
of previous data elements by means of certain processing functions. Therefore, we
need a structure to represent the transformations. The most common approaches
are chains [9,10,13] and graphs [3,20].
4.1 Securing Data Provenance
Secure provenance was introduced to ensure security and privacy to provenance
data. Observe that provenance data is sensitive. It may contain information
on who and when data was updated. E.g., knowing that a certain doctor has
modiﬁed data from a patient can lead to disclosure on who is the doctor of
whom, what type of illness the patient has, and at what time the patient was at
the hospital. Files and databases typically ﬂow within departments and between
companies. It is specially important to ensure that these third parties cannot
access conﬁdential information contained in the data provenance, whilst allowing
them to work with the factual data and update the provenance structure itself.
For example, this would allow to perform analysis on the medical data, preserving
patient privacy. Hence, provenance data needs to follow these databases and
this has to be done ensuring e.g., provenance integrity. Secure data provenance
focuses on these type of problems. A few properties have been established as a
requirement for secure data provenance [9,10,20]:
– Distributed. When databases ﬂow through untrusted environments, and
provenance data is associated to them, we need secure data provenance sys-
tems to be deﬁned so that they work in a distributed environment. We cannot
use a centralized approach with trusted hardware.
– Integrity. In distributed environments it is important that nobody can forge
provenance data. Provenance data is transmitted and provenance structures
are modiﬁed to add the new processes applied to the data. Nevertheless, as
stated above the structure is immutable and no adversary can be granted to
change any part of it. In addition, the provenance system should not allow the
modiﬁcation of a value without expanding the provenance structure. Finally,
deletion of provenance data should not cause that a record of the database
is unreadable. Additional aspects to be taken into account is to consider col-
lusions of intruders (that coalitions of intruders should not be able to attack
integrity), repudiation (that intruders should not be able to repudiate a record
as it was not theirs) or creating forged structures (intruders should not be able
to create new provenance structures).
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– Availability. We are interested in providing security mechanisms to ensure
provenance data availability. Auditors should be able to access provenance
information in a secure, fast and reliable manner to perform any required
operation, e.g. verify the integrity of an ownership sequence without knowing
the individual records.
– Privacy and conﬁdentiality. We need to ensure that disclosure does not
take place, and this is needed for both the database and the provenance data.
Only authorized users can access the information.
These properties need to be combined with the two properties that are general
for any provenance system. They are, completeness and eﬃciency:
– Completeness. That is, that all actions that are relevant to computation
should be detected and represented in the provenance structure. Note that
this is not always easy, because some operations as e.g. cut & paste or manual
copy can exclude relevant provenance information.
– Eﬃciency. Data provenance introduces an overhead to the data. Fine-grained
provenance can double (or more) the size of a database. In addition, operations
on the provenance structure need to be eﬃcient because they also introduce
an overhead on the computation time.
All these properties are relevant in the context of big data provenance. Big
data is often distributed as diﬀerent information sources can contribute in a
computation or in a decision. Therefore, integrity is a basic aspect. We need
that provenance structures are not modiﬁed at will, and we need to be sure that
only permitted operations are applied to them. Availability is then not only a
requirement for auditors but also for the subjects from which the data has been
extracted. In order that individuals can access and apply the right to delete or
rectify a record, they need to be able to know where their data is or if a certain
record contains data that has been generated from their own data.
4.2 Considerations About Privacy and Provenance
When considering big data associated with provenance data, it is important to
clearly deﬁne the possible scenarios that may arise for data privacy. An accepted
classiﬁcation of possible situations is given in [2] on the basis of what is protected
or where do we want to ensure a given degree of privacy (see Table 1):
– Case 1 : The data are kept private and provenance data are also private. Both
need to be protected and their relation has to be preserved.
– Case 2 : The data itself are not protected but provenance data are private.
– Case 3 : Data are private, but the provenance data are not protected.
– Case 4 : No privacy protection are applied to neither the data itself nor the
provenance data.
Depending on the diﬀerent purposes, requirements, and nature of the speciﬁc
data, a given case might apply. Secure data provenance mainly focuses to the
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Table 1. Cases for privacy and data provenance.
Data Provenance
Case 1 Private Private
Case 2 Non-private Private
Case 3 Private Non-private
Case 4 Non-private Non-private
case of private provenance when data is distributed (i.e., we need the system to
satisfy the requirements discussed in Sect. 4.1). In the case of centralized private
data standard anonymization techniques can be used if we want a single-shot
release of this data.
Some of the problems we encounter when data provenance is used depart
from standard solutions of data privacy. We discuss a few examples in the next
section.
4.3 Example of Privacy Problem with Provenance Information
In this section we illustrate an example of a speciﬁc problem that can arise in
big data privacy when considering provenance information. This problem might
occur when individuals request the deletion of their related data from a given
dataset, and thus the model obtained from the data needs to be revised. This
operation will be performed by means of provenance data allowing the data
operator to know exactly which speciﬁc data has to be deleted.
To describe this example, we introduce some notation. We will consider a set
X (a ﬁle or a database) to which we have applied some masking method ρ to
obtain a protected set χ. From χ, using a certain algorithm A we extract a piece
of knowledge Γ . For example, A can be an algorithm to extract decision trees,
therefore Γ is the decision tree inferred from ρ(X).
The set X is modiﬁed with modiﬁcations μ to obtain a data set X ′, which
protected with ρ will yield χ′ and with algorithm A, the piece of knowledge Γ ′.
E.g., Γ ′ is a (diﬀerent) decision tree inferred from ρ(X ′).
Notation and procedures are represented in Fig. 1.
In most cases μ should not be public since it will lead to reidentiﬁcation of
modiﬁed records. In front of this scenario some interesting questions might arise.
– An intruder knows S ⊂ X, Γ , and Γ ′, can this intruder gain knowledge of μ
and S′ ⊆ X \ S with certainty?
– An intruder knows χ and χ′, will this intruder be able to determine μ?
In order to avoid that intruders can make the inferences outlined in the
previous lines, privacy models and privacy algorithms can be deﬁned and imple-
mented. In [18] we introduced a privacy model related to the modiﬁcations of a
database.
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Fig. 1. Example of protected data and its modiﬁcation
5 Summary
In this paper we have proposed a few open questions on the topic of data privacy
for big data. On the one hand, we have discussed lines related to stand-alone
and linked databases. Among them, we want to stress the need that databases
are anonymized in origin, and thus technology is developed to permit controlled
linkability and composability.
On the other hand, we have discussed issues related to data provenance, and
its relationship with data privacy.
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